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Introduction 
This article arises from a much wider, AHRC-funded project on the Politics of Judicial Independence.1  
During that project we developed in interest in the changing relations between the judiciary and 
Parliament, as senior judges recognised a growing need to give an account to Parliament of their 
stewardship of the judiciary and the courts after the Lord Chief Justice replaced the Lord Chancellor as head 
of the judiciary in 2006, and they became jointly responsible for the Courts Service in 2007.2  The main way 
in which judges explain their work to Parliament is by appearing before Select Committees, which they do 
with surprising frequency.  Patrick O’Brien and Robert Hazell found 418 instances of judges giving oral and 
written evidence to parliamentary committees between 1979 and 2014, an average of 12 occasions a year.3  
Most judicial evidence involved talking about the work of the courts and tribunals, or matters such as 
judicial appointments, but in a small proportion (around 20 per cent) of cases judges were invited to give 
evidence about proposed legislation to committees considering bills or draft bills. 
 
Judicial evidence on bills is of particular interest, because under the Guidance to Judges on Appearances 
before Select Committees the Judicial Executive Board has decreed that judges should not comment on, 
inter alia, ‘The merits, meaning or likely effect of provisions in any Bill or other prospective legislation and 
the merits of government policy’.4  Robert Hazell therefore decided to embark on a further study looking 
specifically at judicial evidence on bills, to find out what judges were able to talk about to Parliament 
without transgressing the guidelines.  The study sought to address the following research questions: 
 What do judges talk about when giving evidence to Parliament on bills or draft bills? 
 How often do they transgress the guidance on appearances before Select Committees? 
 What is the value to Parliament, and to the judiciary, of judges giving evidence on proposed 
legislation? 
 
This study is of interest not just in England and Wales, but to other common law countries, because the 
practice at Westminster of inviting judges to give evidence to parliamentary committees is very unusual.  
In Australia, Canada and Ireland, where they have a stricter doctrine of separation of powers, it would be 
regarded as a gross breach of that doctrine to expect a judge to appear before a parliamentary committee. 
                                                          
1 Gee, Hazell, Malleson and O’Brien, The Politics of Judicial Independence in the UK’s Changing Constitution, 
Cambridge University Press 2015.  AHRC Grant No AH/H039554/1 
2 The Lord Chief Justice became head of the judiciary in England and Wales under s7 of the Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005.  He became jointly responsible with the Lord Chancellor for the Courts Service under the 
Framework Document 2008, Cm 7350. 
3 R Hazell and P O’Brien, ‘Meaningful Dialogue: Judicial Engagement with Parliamentary Committees at 
Westminster’ Public Law 2016:1 pp 54-73. 
4 Judicial Executive Board, Guidance to Judges on Appearances before Select Committees, October 2012 




Paradoxically it is in the United States, long regarded as strict upholders of separation of powers, where 
the practice of judges appearing before Congressional committees appears most prevalent.  The great 
majority of these appearances concern judicial nominations, court appropriations and the administration 
of justice, but American judges do sometimes appear before Congress to discuss proposed legislation.5  And 
when they do, American judges offer a surprisingly pragmatic justification of the practice.  Robert 
Katzmann, Chief Judge of the US Court of Appeals, has said that “when a committee of Congress is 
considering revising a complex piece of legislation, it might be useful for judges experienced in interpreting 
the statute to testify as to the technical difficulties in discerning congressional meaning”.6  And for the 
judges, their task of statutory interpretation can be strengthened because “having a basic understanding 
of legislative lawmaking can only better prepare [them] to understand their interpretive responsibilities”.7  
As we shall see, this pragmatic justification has strong echoes in the practice of judges giving evidence 
about proposed legislation at Westminster. 
 
Judicial Evidence on Bills at Westminster 
 
The first step in our research was to compile a database of all the recorded occasions on which a judge has 
given evidence before a select committee, on a Bill or draft Bill. Each separate instance of a judge submitting 
evidence was counted once, irrespective of whether she or he appeared on multiple other occasions before 
the same committee, and of whether a select committee panel had more than one judge appearing before 
it. Where a body of judges (the Association of HM District Judges, for instance) provided written evidence, 
however, this was counted only once. 1979 was taken as the starting point since that was when 
departmental select committees were instituted on a systematic basis at Westminster.  From 1979 to 2015 
there were 41 instances of judges giving oral evidence, and a further 46 instances of written evidence, on 
a total of 20 different Bills and draft Bills. Of the 46 pieces of written evidence, [8?] were supplemental 
memorandums submitted following oral testimony. 
 
The table below lists in chronological order the 20 bills and draft bills, with the names of the judges giving 
oral or written evidence in each case.  
 





Select Committee Subject of 
Evidence 
Judge(s) Giving Oral 
Evidence 
Judge(s) Giving Written 
Evidence 
                                                          
5 Rishikoff and Perry, full ref needed 
6 R Katzmann, Interbranch Relations, Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Organisation of Congress, 
1993 p 88. 
7 R Katzmann, Judging Statutes, p 22. 
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1984 House of Commons Special 
Standing Committee on the 






Mr Justice Gibson, 
President of the Family 
Division Sir John Arnold, 
and Lord Scarman 
 
 
1994 House of Lords Special Standing 
Committee on the Law of Property 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 




Mr Justice Brooke, 





House of Lords Special Public Bill 
Committee on the Private 






Mr Justice Brooke, 
Chairman of Law 
Commission 
Mr Justice Parker, Mr 
Justice Staughton, 
President of the Family 
Division Sir Stephen 
Brown, Sheriff Principal 
Nicholson, Lord Bingham 
MR, Lord Kemp Davidson, 
Lord Simon, Lord Ackner 
(retired), Lord Denning 
(retired), Lord Donaldson 
(retired) 
 
1995 House of Lords Special Public Bill 
Committee on the Family Homes 
and Domestic Violence Bill 
Family Homes and 
Domestic Violence 
Bill 
His Honour Judge Fricker, 
Mr Justice Brooke 
(chairman of Law 
Commission), Ms Justice 
Hale (former Family Law 
member of Law 
Commission) 
District Judge Angel, 
District Judge Bird, District 
Judge Greenslade, His 
Honour Judge Fricker, Ms 
Justice Graham Hall, Mr 
Justice Jenkins, President 
of the Family Division Sir 
Stephen Brown, 
Association of District 
Judges 
 
1997 House of Lords Select Committee 








 Lord President Rodger 
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1999 House of Commons Select 






Vice-Chancellor of the 
High Court Sir Richard 
Scott, Lord Woolf MR 
 




Service Bill (Draft) 
Mr Justice Richards, Lord 
Justice Judge 
The Judges’ Council 








Lord Bingham  
2004-
05 
House of Lords Select Committee 
on the Constitutional Reform Bill 
Constitutional 
Reform Bill 
Ms Rachel Lipscomb, Lady 
Justice Arden, Lord Justice 
Thomas, Lord Woolf LCJ 
(testified twice), Lord 
Bingham, Lord Hope 
(testified twice), Lord 
Nicholls, Lord Ackner 
(retired), Lord Mackay 
(retired), Lord President 
Cullen, Justice Gault (New 
Zealand), Justice Sir 
Kenneth Keith (New 
Zealand), Chief Justice 
Dame Sian Elias (New 
Zealand) 
 
Lord Justice Carnwarth, 
Lord Woolf LCJ, Baroness 
Hale, Lord Brightman 
(retired), Lord Cooke 
(retired), Lord Donaldson 
(retired), Lord Jauncey 
(retired), Lord Nolan 
(retired), Lord President 
Cullen, Judge Schiemann 
(European Court of 
Justice), Chief Justice 




Joint Committee on the Draft 
Mental Health Bill 
 
Mental Health Bill 
(Draft) 
His Honour Judge 
Sycamore 
Regional Chairs of the 
Mental Health Review 
Tribunals 
 
2005 House of Commons Home Affairs 






President of the Queen’s 
Bench Division Sir Igor 
Judge 
President of the Queen’s 




2006 House of Commons Select 
Committee on the Armed Forces 
Bill 
 
Armed Forces Bill Judge Advocate General of 
the Armed Forces Jeff 
Blackett 
Judge Advocate General of 
the Armed Forces Jeff 
Blackett 






Ms Cindy Barnett, 
chairman of Magistrates’ 
Association 
 
2008 House of Commons Special Public 
Bill Committee on the Health and 
Social Care Bill 
 
Health and Social 
Care Bill 
Lady Justice Smith, chair of 
the Shipman Inquiry 
 
2008 Joint Committee on the Draft 






 Lord Phillips LCJ (testified 
twice), Lord Mackay 
(retired) 




Mr Justice Tugendhat, Sir 
Stephen Sedley (retired), 








Ms Justice Pauffley, Mr 
Justice Ryder 
Ms Sally Simon (retired), 
Magistrates’ Association, 
Association of Her 
Majesty’s District Judges, 
Judges of the Family 
Division 
 
2013 Joint Committee on the Draft 





Lord Mackay (retired)  
2014 Joint Committee on the Draft 








2014 House of Lords Special Public Bill 
Committee on the Insurance Bill 
 
Insurance Bill Lord Justice Longmore, 
Lord Mance JSC 
Lord Justice Longmore 
2015 Joint Committee on the Draft 




Judge McKenna (Principal 







Analysing the Evidence 
 
A. General Trends in Judicial Testimony on Bills 
 
The overall figures disclose that there has been an increase, decade on decade, in the number of judicial 
submissions on Bills and draft Bills: there were three instances of judicial testimony in the 1980s, 26 in the 
1990s, 41 in the 2000s, and 17 so far in the 2010s. If submissions in the current decade continue at the 
same rate, they will be on course to match the 2000s with approximately 40 instances of testimony.  30 
submissions in the 2000s were concerned with major constitutional reform measures which directly 
affected the institutional position of the judiciary; in the 2010s, submissions have continued at a similar 
rate, despite the fact that none have been concerned with major planks of constitutional reform. It may 
also be noted that the 2010s have so far seen no perceptible decrease in the provision of testimony, despite 
the tightening of centralised control over judicial appearances by the Lord Chief Justice in 2012. The overall 
growth in judicial testimony on legislative proposals, indeed, may be traced primarily to the fact that the 
legislative process has been ‘opened up’ in recent years.8 The Blair administration began the practice of 
systematically publishing Bills in draft for pre-legislative scrutiny, and half of the legislative proposals on 
which judges have commented have been drafts. Public Bill Committees were introduced in 2006, for the 
first time allowing evidence taking during the Committee stage; since then, [XX] out of [22] submissions 
have been made to committees of this sort. More broadly, the growing reach and influence of Westminster 
select committees has played a role in enhancing the frequency and depth of pre-legislative scrutiny: the 
Lords Constitution Committee, for instance, was created in 2001 to examine all public Bills for their 
constitutional implications, and since then has been one of the more frequent recipients of judicial 
evidence on legislative proposals.  Dedicated joint committees are now regularly appointed to examine 
major draft Bills: since 2004, [6] such committees have taken a total of [13] submissions from judicial 
witnesses. 
 
                                                          
8 Meaningful Dialogue article. 
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Beneath these headline figures, moreover, oral and written testimony exhibit distinct trends: of the 26 
submissions made in the 1990s, 19 were written and seven oral; in the 2000s, 20 were written and 21 oral; 
and in the 2010s, seven have been written and ten oral. Notwithstanding the three submissions made in 
the 1980s (all oral), it appears that written submissions have continued at a fairly consistent rate since the 
early 1990s, and that, conversely, the provision of oral testimony has become customary only gradually. 
One reason for this, perhaps, is that some judges have become less guarded about appearing before select 
committees, as the practice has become institutionally more normalised and as experience has shown that 
pre-legislative questioning by select committees is generally collaborative and courteous, as opposed to 
interrogatory and hostile. It is also carefully choreographed.  As an example, Lord Woolf, then Master of 
the Rolls, told the Select Committee on Public Administration in 1999 that he and fellow witness Sir Richard 
Scott were “very grateful to your Clerk warning us of what we have in store for us by way of cross-
examination”.9 In the years that followed, Lord Woolf gave evidence on a number of further occasions, 
even volunteering to testify before the Select Committee on Public Administration again in 2004, on the 
subject of public inquiries.10 
 
These 87 instances of judicial testimony related to a total of 20 pieces of proposed legislation, of which half 
were Bills and half draft Bills. The legislation at issue covered a wide range of topic areas, from constitutional 
and public law, to crime and family law, to general civil law. Figure 2 shows the number of Bills and draft 




                                                          
9 Woolf on FOI Bill, at Q883. 




















Crime Civil Law Family Law EU and
International
Law
Figure 2: Number of Bills and Submissions by Subject 
Area
Number of Bills Number of Submissions
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To illustrate the application of these categories in action, the ‘Constitutional Law’ category comprised the 
Constitutional Reform Bill of 2004 and the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill of 2008; and ‘Public Law’, the 
Draft Freedom of Information Bill of 1997 and the Draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill of 2013. ‘Healthcare 
and Regulatory Law’ included the Health and Social Care Bill of 2007; ‘Crime’ included the Draft Criminal 
Defence Service Bill 2004, reforming criminal legal aid, and the Draft Corporate Manslaughter Bill in 2005; 
and ‘Family’, the Family Homes and Domestic Violence Bill of 1995 and the 2012 Children and Families Bill. 
‘EU and International Law’ included Brussels II: The Draft Convention on Jurisdiction, Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters, and the Private International Law (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Bill of 1995. It may be noted that the categorisation of proposed legislation according to subject 
was not always wholly straightforward: the subject-matter and provisions contained in Bills sometimes cut 
across multiple topic areas.  
 
What is clear, is that judicial involvement in the pre-legislative scrutiny process has not been limited to 
certain narrow subject areas; the Bills on which judges have commented have been wide-ranging in terms 
of their subject-matter. At the same time, certain legislative proposals have attracted a disproportionately 
high number of submissions. This has usually been because the proposed legislation related to 
constitutional matters of particular importance to the judiciary: for example, 30 submissions were made 
on the Constitutional Reform Bill between 2004 and 2005.  Other bills made significant or highly technical 
changes to the law, about which individual judges were concerned: thus the Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill generated 11 submissions in 1995, as did the Family Homes and Domestic 
Violence Bill in the same year. There are differences, too, as regards the seniority of the judicial witnesses 







The overwhelming majority of submissions within the ‘Public Law’ and ‘Constitutional Law’ categories were 
made by senior judges (at the level of the Court of Appeal or above, including retired justices), with a further 
seven submissions on the Constitutional Reform Bill by senior international judges. The complexity of issues 
within the ‘Civil Law’ category, including defamation, insurance and charities law, meant that senior judges 
have dominated here, with seven out of nine submissions being made by them. By contrast, middle-ranking 
(High Court and Circuit judges) and junior judges (at the level of District judge and below) more frequently 
comment on Bills in the spheres of ‘Crime’ and ‘Family Law’ – 10 out of 20 submissions on family matters, 
for instance, were made by middle-ranking judges, four by junior judges, and a further four by bodies of 
judges including the Association of HM District Judges. 
 
B. The Content of Evidence Sessions 
 
To analyse the content of the evidence sessions, a sample was drawn from the total number of bills listed 
in Figure 1, using a stratified sampling method.11 The first layer of stratification was according to decade 
(with the year 1979 included in the 1980s), with a second layer according to judicial rank, so that there was 
                                                          







































Crime Civil Law Family Law EU and
International
Law
Collective Responses International Judges Junior Judges
Middle-Ranking Judges Senior Judges
Figure 3: Number of Submissions by Rank of Judge and by Area 
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a broadly representative number of evidence sessions, oral and written, from each decade and from each 
level of judicial seniority. This produced, for oral evidence, one session from the 1980s, two from the 1990s, 
six from the 2000s, and five from the 2010s. In the sample of written evidence, there was no evidence 
dating from the 1980s (since there were in fact no written submissions by judges in the course of that 
decade). There were four submissions from the 1990s, five from the 2000s, and two from the 2010s. The 
sampling was done without a view as to content, and a small number of the evidence sessions in the sample 
turned out to be disappointingly brief.  These were replaced with fuller submissions from the same decade 
(indeed, where possible, the same Bill), made by judicial office-holders of the same or similar rank.  
 
The first step in assessing the sampled evidence sessions was to gain an overall impression of the length 
and structure of judicial testimony. When giving oral evidence, judges are generally asked to introduce 
themselves for the record, and to give a statement summarising their views on the topic to be discussed, 
before being asked questions by individual members. Written submissions will usually follow the structure 
of the consultation questions published or circulated by the select committee, though sometimes judges 
will simply write a statement recording their own concerns. On occasion, written evidence takes the form 
of a memorandum submitted following oral evidence, on a specific subject which arose in the course of the 
hearing. Submissions were in general full and detailed, with an average of 21 points made by judges in 
writing, and 30 in oral evidence.  
 
What do the judges talk about? 
 
Judges appear as expert witnesses, expert in the law, and in how the law works – or does not work - in their 
particular field.  Some parliamentarians may have qualified as lawyers, but few remain in practice, and they 
very rarely have the same level of expertise.  So the main function of evidence sessions is educational: 
judges explain how the law currently operates in their field, how the proposed legislation might work, how 
it could be improved.  In the sessions which we sampled, there were several good examples of this.  One 
was Sir Igor Judge (then President of the Queen’s Bench Division) giving evidence on the Draft Corporate 
Manslaughter Bill.12  He explained the existing common law offence of manslaughter, the undesirability of 
having different criteria for the new corporate offence, whether it should apply to unincorporated bodies, 
or the police, the civil duty of care, how the judge would direct the jury, whether it would be a hindrance 
or a help to list the factors to be borne in mind.  Another example was Judge Jeff Blackett, Judge Advocate 
General, giving written evidence to the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill.13  He welcomed the 
Bill, in bringing the standards of the Court-Martial closer to those of the Crown Court, but then pointed to 
those areas where the Bill did not go far enough: in the composition and minimum size of panels, majority 
verdicts, sentencing remaining with the panel when it should be left to the judge advocate.  His submission 
closed with a summary of all the main points, and a schedule of the clauses he wished to see amended.  A 
third example of judges educating the committee was the evidence of two High Court judges, Sir Ernest 
Ryder and Dame Anna Pauffley, on the draft Children and Families Bill.14  A key recommendation of the 
                                                          
12 Joint sitting of the Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committee, 21 November 2005. 
13 Written evidence to the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill, January 2006. 
14 Commons Justice Committee, 20 November 2012. 
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Norgrove review of family justice and the Ryder report on its implementation was to halve the average time 
limit for cases of children being taken into care, and Ernest Ryder explained the practicalities that needed 
to be resolved: training for judges on prioritising their work load, more proactive case management, better 
management information, a care monitoring system, and involving family court lawyers and social workers 
in the reforms and not just the judges. This gave the committee useful background before discussing some 
of the details of the draft Bill.  
 
In discussing the content of bills judges will quite often venture their own views on the policy.  They will say 
(as the Judge Advocate General did) whether they support the bill.  And they will say (as he also did) if they 
think it does not go far enough.  In similar vein, Sir Richard Scott (then Vice-Chancellor, and recent chair of 
the Arms to Iraq inquiry) felt that the Freedom of Information Bill was ‘much, much too cautious’, and 
suggested that it could be improved by a purpose clause, and by including a requirement on all public 
bodies to give reasons for their decisions.15  Sir Ralph Gibson, as chairman of the Law Commission, when 
asked what should be the minimum period before a spouse could file a petition for divorce, said ‘I see no 
reason why, for the sake of either convenience or justice, the time limit should not be reduced to one 
year’.16  Sir Andrew Longmore, a Court of Appeal judge who was an insurance expert, suggested changes 
to the Insurance Bill which would benefit policy holders but went against the advice of Lloyds.17  And Sir 
Michael Tugendhat, a specialist libel judge, supported the proposal in the Defamation Bill to remove the 
presumption in favour of trial by jury, because jury trials had become unmanageable. 18  
 
But judges are careful not go too far.  When Sir Michael Tugendhat was asked whether libel judges should 
have power to order corrections or apologies, he said that if judges were given the power, they would use 
it, with the corresponding benefit that damages would be lower.  But he added, ‘I do not think it is for me 
to say whether this should be done or not’.19 Similarly Sir Igor Judge, when asked whether there should be 
public policy exemptions to the new offence of corporate manslaughter, said ‘you are really asking me to 
comment on a policy issue.  I think I would be happier not to answer that question …’.20 
 
Judges will also offer advice on drafting and interpretation.  This is despite the clear instruction to judges 
not to comment on the meaning or likely effect of provisions in a Bill, lest they be subsequently asked to 
interpret those provisions in court.  In the sessions in our sample, Sir Igor Judge suggested that ‘benefits’ 
or ‘profits’ could be used interchangeably in the Corporate Manslaughter Bill.21  But when giving evidence 
on the draft Modern Slavery Bill, he warned against using different formulations for the defendant’s state 
of knowledge in clauses 1 and 2, saying that lawyers would argue there must be a different meaning if the 
words used are different: ‘it is critical – not for the Court of Appeal, but for the poor trial judge – that we 
should have the same words used, if that is what we mean to say’.22  In his evidence on the draft Freedom 
                                                          
15 Public Administration Select Committee, 14 July 1999, at Q911 and Q884. 
16 Oral evidence on Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Bill, 20 March 1984. 
17 Special Public Bill Committee on Insurance Bill, 3 December 2014. 
18 Joint Committee on Defamation Bill, 6 July 2011 at Q622. 
19 Ibid at Q625. 
20 Joint sitting of Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committee, 21 November 2005 at Q511. 
21 Ibid at Q504. 
22 Joint Committee on Draft Modern Slavery Bill, 25 February 2014 at Q644 and Q648. 
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of Information Bill, Lord Woolf discussed at length what ‘substantial’ would add to the harm test in the 
exemption provisions.23  And in commenting on the exception provisions in the draft Children and Families 
Bill, Sir Ernest Ryder explained that he could not offer an interpretation, but then went on to do so: ‘You 
won’t expect me to give an interpretation that binds either myself or my colleagues for the future … my 
personal view is that “with a view to” is intended to qualify both sub-sections (i) and (ii) …’.24 
 
Judges will also offer more general advice about drafting technique.  Several evidence sessions discussed 
the pros and cons of defining things in statute or leaving it to the discretion of the judges.  The Defamation 
Bill was a codification of the common law, leading Sir Michael Tugendhat to ask at one point, ‘are we doing 
more harm than good?’.25 It might be expected that judges would favour retaining maximum discretion, 
but that is not always the case.  In discussing the harm test in the draft Freedom of Information Bill, Lord 
Woolf said ‘It is much better that the Act defines it and that we do not leave it to case law, because there 
are precedents … where … some would say the courts have emasculated legislation and really defeated 
what was intended’.26  And here is Lord Judge, arguing against including statutory defences in the draft 
Modern Slavery Bill for those who had been victims of trafficking: ‘… broad declarations in an Act of 
Parliament about what should and should not apply always run into trouble.  One of the worst forms of 
legislation is deeming anything.  It really is, because the facts never ever fit the bill of whatever had been 
deemed.  So I would caution against that’.27 
 
As these last quotations imply, a lot of judicial evidence involves judges drawing on their long experience 
to make general points about how a statutory provision might work in practice.  Some of these are about 
interpretation; some about practice and procedure, and the workload of the courts.  Sir Michael Tugendhat 
advised against early neutral evaluation of libel claims by an interim judge, simply on workload grounds: ‘If 
I had to make judges available for early neutral evaluation, they would immediately be written off as the 
trial judge.  I do not see how it would work in practice with the resources we have available’.28  Judge Phillip 
Sycamore also raised serious concerns about the additional workload arising under the draft Mental Health 
Bill, suggesting that it would quadruple the number of hearings before Mental Health Review Tribunals.29 
And the Judges’ Council cautioned against the re-introduction of means testing in their written evidence 
on the Criminal Defence Service Bill, because of the delays which would ensue: ‘One of the problems under 
the old means-testing system was the delay in obtaining from defendants the documents needed to 
establish whether any contribution was required.’30  But the judges do not always oppose procedural 
changes: they supported the idea that in uncontested divorces a decree nisi could be approved by a court 
clerk rather than going before a judge.31 
                                                          
23 Public Administration Select Committee, 14 July 1999. 
24 Commons Justice Committee, 20 November 2012 at Q72. 
25 Joint Committee on Defamation Bill, 6 July 2011 at Q618. 
26 Public Administration Select Committee, 14 July 1999 at Q892. 
27 Joint Committee on Draft Modern Slavery Bill, 25 February 2014 at Q640. 
28 Joint Committee on Defamation Bill, 6 July 2011 at Q626. 
29 Joint Committee on draft Mental Health Bill, 28 October 2004 at Q724. 
30 Written evidence to Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee on Criminal Defence Service Bill, 21 June 
2004. 




In a lot of judicial evidence the judges are also involved in upholding the principle of judicial independence.  
The guidance to judges contains a specific exception allowing them to comment on the merits of a bill, or 
government policy, if it affects the independence of the judiciary.32  This enabled typically robust comment 
from Lord Ackner on the Constitutional Reform Bill, of which he was a fierce critic.33  Giving evidence on 
the same Bill, Lord Bingham argued strongly for greater operational and functional independence for the 
new Supreme Court, and sought to find a way of making it financially independent of government.34  He 
was also keen for the Minister to have no choice in making appointments to the Supreme Court, ‘because 
the whole object of the exercise is to make this demonstrably independent and devoid of political input’.35  
But questions of judicial independence can arise not only at these elevated levels, but all the way down the 
judicial hierarchy.  The Judge Advocate General wanted the Military Court Service to be resourced and 
administered by the Department for Constitutional Affairs, like the civilian courts service, and for Court-
Martial listing to be done under judicial control.36  Judge Phillip Sycamore had a rather different concern, 
about judicial functions being extended beyond their proper role.  He was troubled by the proposal that 
mental health tribunals should approve care plans: in his view, that was not a judicial function, and the 
tribunal hearing risked becoming more of a case conference.37   
 
A final point worth mentioning is that the judges are not always in agreement in the evidence they give.  
This was particularly prominent in the evidence sessions on the Constitutional Reform Bill, where Lord 
Bingham himself acknowledged ‘the government are very well aware that some of the Law Lords favour 
the Supreme Court proposal and others do not’.38  Indeed, there was open disagreement between Lord 
Bingham, then senior law lord, and Lord Nicholls (second senior law lord) about the desirability of 
establishing a new Supreme Court, and the risk of it expanding its role and powers.39  Again, disagreements 
are not only found at these elevated levels.  In evidence to the Special Public Bill Committee on the Private 
International Law Bill Sir Jonathan Parker was very critical of Part III (on the choice of law in tort), saying 
that ‘the subclause could hardly be drawn in wider or vaguer terms … the judges are being asked to perform 
an impossible task’.40  But only a week later Sir Christopher Staughton LJ wrote in to say ‘Part III is welcome 
as bringing a degree of resolution to an old chestnut … it is to be welcomed as introducing a measure of 
certainty’!41 
 
Quantitative Analysis of the Content of Judicial Evidence 
 
                                                          
32 Judicial Executive Board, Guidance to Judges on Appearances before Select Committees, 2012 at para 13. 
33 Lords Select Committee on Constitutional Reform Committee, 20 April 2004. 
34 Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee, 25 May 2004 at Q111. 
35 Ibid at Q100. 
36 Written evidence to Select Committee on Armed Forces Bill, January 2006 at para 6.4. 
37 Joint Committee on draft Mental Health Bill 28 October 2004 at Q724. 
38 Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee, 25 May 2004 at Q125. 
39 Lords Select Committee on Constitutional Reform Bill, 22 April 2004 at p12. 
40 Written memorandum to Special Public Bill Committee on Private International Law Bill, 6 January 1995. 
41 Written memorandum to Special Public Bill Committee on Private International Law Bill, 16 January 1995. 
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The next, more systematic stage in our research consisted in the development and application of a coding 
framework, to be supplemented by selecting quotations from the sessions to illustrate the analysis. Across 
the sampled evidence sessions, written and oral, points made by judges were analysed across six broad 
categories. These were: statements giving factual information and accounts of experiences; explanations 
of current law, legal practice and policy; points about the current administration of the justice system; 
comments about the roles of the different branches of government; comments on prospective policy; and 
comments on the proposed legislation itself. For oral evidence sessions, we added a seventh category, for 
judges’ refusals to answer questions posed by members of select committees, where they felt it 
transgressed constitutionally appropriate boundaries. An equivalent set of labels was applied to questions 
asked by committee members – but not to written questions, since select committees usually send out a 
generic set of written questions in their calls for evidence. Figures 4 to 6 show the breakdown of questions 











Figure 4: Types of Questions asked by Committees 
(Oral)
Facts and Experiences













Figure 5: Types of Points Made by Judges (Oral)
Facts and Experiences












Across all three sets of analysis, comments on the proposed legislation formed the bulk of the material, 
reflecting the primary purpose of the evidence. In oral evidence sessions, questions and answers were 
spread fairly evenly across the remaining categories. Slightly fewer points were made under the ‘current 
administration of the justice system’ and the ‘institutions of the state’ – and, in the case of judicial 
witnesses, ‘refusals to answer’ – categories, at 4 to 8 per cent each. A somewhat different picture emerges 
with written submissions: here, statements of fact and accounts of experiences received significantly less 
attention. There is little cause for a judge making a written submission to give significant amounts of factual 
information or anecdotal evidence42 – on the one hand, written submissions tend to be succinct and formal, 
often presuming knowledge of much of the relevant factual background to the legislation; and on the other, 
select committee members often solicit factual information as a lead-in to more substantive questioning.  
 
The other key difference was that there was a far greater emphasis on setting out current law and practice 
(34 per cent of the points made in written submissions), largely because written submissions often contain 




Transgressing constitutional lines? 
 
We next analysed the content of judicial evidence on bills by reference to the Judicial Executive Board’s 
Guidance to Judges on Appearances before Select Committees, to see whether judges managed to stay 
within the guidelines. The guidelines generally prohibit, as a matter of constitutional convention, 
commentary on (i) the merits of individual cases; (ii) the personalities or merits of public officials including 
judges, or the general quality of judicial appointments; and (iii) the merits, meaning or likely effect of 
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provisions in any prospective legislation, and the merits of government policy. As a matter of ‘desirable 
practice’, comments on issues which are subject to government consultation on which the judiciary intend 
to make a formal institutional response, but have yet to do so, are discouraged.43 Nevertheless, the 
guidance carves out substantial exceptions within these areas, generating the constitutional ‘space’ in 
which much judicial-parliamentary dialogue on legislative proposals becomes possible. Judges with 
‘leadership responsibilities’ (such as the Lord Chief Justice and Heads of Division) may comment on the 
general quality of judicial appointments.44 Most significantly, for our purposes, a number of key exceptions 
are made in relation to convention (iii). First, where the subject-matter at issue is existing legislation or 
policy, it is accepted that there is a tradition of “responsible comment on the way in which an [existing] Act 
works, including unexpected consequences of legislation”.45 Second, where the subject-matter is 
prospective legislation or policy, the lines are drawn slightly more narrowly, so that judges may only 
comment on “the merit of a Bill or policy which affects the independence of the judiciary” or on its 
“practical operation or technical aspects”, provided that it “directly affects the operation of the courts or 
aspects of the administration of justice within the judge’s particular area of judicial responsibility or 
expertise”.46 
 
We analysed the content of judicial evidence by reference to these distinctions. Thus the category covering 
‘current law, legal practice and policy’ was broken down into ‘responsible comments on current law, legal 
practice and policy’, ‘comments on the merits of individual cases’, and ‘comments on the merits of existing 
policy in areas of controversy’. Likewise, the two broader labels of ‘comments on the proposed legislation’ 
and ‘comments on proposed policy’ were split into ‘comments on the merits and likely effect of provisions 
in the legislation’ and ‘comments on the merits of the policy’ on the one hand, and categories covering the 
two exceptions to convention (iii), above, on the other. The aim, then, was to gain an insight into the nature 
of judicial contributions on proposed legislation, and to assess the extent to which judges deviate from 
their own institutionally set standards in testifying. Again, a similar set of subdivided categories was used 
to assess points made by committee members in the course of oral questioning, in order to gain a clearer 
understanding of the interactive nature of the relationship between parliamentarians and the judiciary in 
these legislative scrutiny hearings – and, in particular, to investigate the role of select committees in 
drawing judicial witnesses into answering potentially improper lines of questioning. 
 
Across all submissions by judges, ‘comments on the merits of existing policy in areas of controversy’ were 
highly unusual, and judges are on the whole alert to the need to steer clear of such issues. Equally, there 
were virtually no ‘comments on the merits of individual cases’. It appears that judges are especially 
concerned about lines of questioning that would fall within this category: it is symptomatic that, where 
judges made explicit reference to the constraints on what they could say, this was frequently framed in 
terms of a concern to avoid questions on individual cases. The following excerpt from Lady Justice Smith’s 
                                                          
43 Guidance, para 3. Contrasts with the decentralisation and ‘maverick ventures’ of the US federal judiciary. 
44 Guidance, para 9. 
45 Guidance, para 12. 
46 Guidance, para 13. 
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evidence before the House of Commons Committee on the Health and Social Care Bill in 2008 provides an 
example: 
 
The Chairman: … My colleagues understand that there are certain questions that you cannot 
answer because of your position. If, at any stage, you feel that the questions are not appropriate, 
feel free to say. 
Lady Justice Smith: I will say so, but generally any difficulty will arise out of individual cases. I cannot 
imagine that you are going to ask me about those.47 
 
In the realm of prospective legislation and policy, by contrast, the patterns become altogether more 
complicated. There were few clear instances of comments by judges ‘on the merits, meaning or likely effect 
of provisions in the proposed legislation’ – less than 7 per cent of points made in answering oral questions, 
and less than 4 per cent in the case of written submissions – or indeed of ‘comments on the merits of 
proposed policy’.  But occasionally judges do stray into offering advice on the meaning of legislation. Two 
examples are given: the first is drawn from Lord Woolf’s evidence on the Freedom of Information Bill in 
1999:  
 
Q886: … Is it your understanding, first of all, that… there is a difference between “prejudice” and 
“substantial harm”? I use “substantial harm” because that was the phrase used in the White Paper 
which preceded the Bill. In a common-sense way, is the move from “substantial harm” to 
“prejudice” to be seen as a weakening? 
Lord Woolf: Undoubtedly. I do not think there is much distinction, if any, between “prejudice” and 
“harm”; prejudice involves harm. Once you put “substantial” in front of the word “harm” you are 
adding something which is not there in relation to prejudice. If you said “substantial prejudice”, 
then I would suggest there is not much significance. The way I would expect the court to view the 
word “prejudice” on its own is that there must be some real prejudice as opposed to a merely 
fanciful prejudice – we are talking about something which has some weight – but if you then add 
the word “substantial” that is something beyond what “prejudice” by itself means. 
 
The second comes from the evidence of Sir Igor Judge (as he was then) on the Draft Corporate 
Manslaughter Bill in 2005: 
 
Q504 Gwyn Prosser: One of the factors which the jury is asked to consider, amongst others, is 
whether the managers or the company profited from the action or the omission. We have had 
some evidence which suggests that would better be replaced by “benefits” rather than “profits”. 
Do you have any strong feelings on the use of those words? 
Sir Igor Judge: You could use both almost interchangeably. What you are really getting at is the 
company that chooses to turn a blind eye to its responsibilities in order to make money or profit 
or benefit. I do not actually see a great difference myself. 
 
                                                          
47 Smith evidence. 
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More frequently, judges stray into commenting on the merits of the proposed legislation or policy. These 
included statements of support for the provisions in the Bill or for its overall policy, or comments on the 
merits which were within the broad territory of the ‘judicial independence’ and ‘practical operation and 
technical aspects’ exceptions, but which were not clear and precise instantiations of them. In his evidence 
in 1999, Lord Woolf made the following observations, which, although about the ‘practical operation’ and 
possible pitfalls of the Draft Freedom of Information Bill, did not directly relate to ‘the operation of the 
courts or aspects of the administration of justice’: 
 
Lord Woolf: … what this Bill is doing and what it is about is giving people rights to information before 
the documents reach the Public Record Office… the Public Record Office is dealing with the 
wholesale in that once the documents get there, they are readily available to people and it is very 
important… that there is a proper bridge between those two services and I think it is unwittingly 
done, it is not intentional, but by amending or by deleting part of the old Act, they have 
unfortunately undermined that very important role.48 
 
And before the House of Lords Committee on the Constitutional Reform Bill in 2004, Lord Ackner made the 
following recommendations about the drafting and effect of the Bill: 
 
Lord Ackner: … clause 1 must in terms say that there is an obligation upon ministers to maintain 
and support the rule of law. If that had existed the ouster clause [in the Asylum and Immigration 
Bill 2003] would have had no breath of life and the intervention of a retired Lord Chancellor would 
not have been necessary.49 
 
Clearly, these were comments which were on point and wholly appropriate for Lord Ackner to make, since 
the judiciary must also participate in the shared governmental responsibility to negotiate and uphold 
‘constitutionality’ and the rule of law. Yet they are also not absolutely or positively secured by the Judicial 
Executive Board’s guidelines, which on a strict interpretation refer narrowly to contributions which go to 
‘judicial independence’ – as Lord Ackner himself acknowledged, “[t]he independence of the judiciary is a 
very important pillar but it is not the same thing.”50 
 
The subject-matter of the proposed legislation is often key in determining how far and how often the 
Judicial Executive Board’s guidance is breached. Submissions on the Constitutional Reform Bill and its 
progeny rarely strayed over the boundaries of propriety, since matters relating to judicial independence 
were consistently at the forefront of discussions with judges. Equally, evidence on proposed legislation 
such as the Mental Health Bill in 2005 and the Armed Forces Bill in 2006 was more likely to stay within the 
confines of commentary ‘on practical operation or technical aspects’ which ‘directly affected the operation 
of the courts or aspects of the administration of justice’, since these were largely concerned with reforming 
court structures and procedure. In addition, there were a number of instances where the judicial witness 
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was appearing in a dual capacity, for example because they chaired an inquiry into a matter related to the 
proposed legislation. Sir Richard Scott’s evidence on the Draft Freedom of Information Bill in 1999, for 
instance, was given against the background of his report on the Arms to Iraq Inquiry; and Lady Justice 
Smith’s submissions on the Health and Social Care Bill in 2008 arose directly out of the recommendations 
she made as chair of the Shipman Inquiry. The first question put to her in the course of questioning was as 
follows: 
 
Q61 Sandra Gidley: The Bill makes a number of changes to the regulation of health care 
professionals, particularly in medicine. Are the changes proposed in the Bill broadly in line with 
your findings and recommendations?51 
 
In such circumstances, judges have a greater propensity to make overt suggestions on how to improve the 
policy and drafting of the proposed legislation. An example may again be drawn from Lady Justice Smith’s 
evidence: 
 
Q64 Sandra Gidley: ... Would you like to see any other changes to the Bill? Are we missing an 
opportunity here? 
Lady Justice Smith: There is one … I recommended that adjudication panels should be chaired by 
legally qualified people. I explained a number of reasons why I made that recommendation…52 
 
Other variables which appeared to affect the frequency and extent of submissions which violated or 
stretched the guidelines included the seniority and status of the judicial witness: senior judges and retired 
judges were generally more relaxed about commenting on the merits of proposed legislation and policy. 
Personality, too, played a part, with some senior judges being more likely than others to speak out on issues 
not strictly protected by the guidelines. Another factor was the role played by select committees in drawing 
judges into discussions that could potentially impair their impartiality. A greater proportion of questions 
were on the effect or merits of proposed legislation and policy, than were judges’ answers. When faced 
with such questions, judges can simply refuse to answer, or they may deflect the question by responding 
with a statement of fact or an exposition of the current legal position. Nevertheless, select committees 
were sometimes successful, through persistent questioning, in obtaining a direct answer, as shown by the 
following excerpt from Sir Igor Judge’s evidence on the Draft Corporate Manslaughter Bill in 2005: 
 
Q497 Chairman: The second point of coverage is about police forces, which are not incorporated 
bodies. There is a weight of evidence, and indeed an assumption by everybody we have spoken to, 
including the police themselves, that they should be covered by the legislation. Do you have views 
as to how that might be done? 
Sir Igor Judge: As to whether it should be done, that absolutely is policy. 
Q498 Chairman: Even the police have come here saying they should be covered by it. 
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Sir Igor Judge: It is still a matter of policy, but let us pause to think. We are envisaging the police 
behaving in such a way that either a police officer is killed or a member of the public is killed 
because somebody in the organisation has been grossly negligent. In principle, I see no reason why 
it should not apply to the police. 
 
This feature of the dynamic between judges and legislators is further borne out by the fact that the 
incidence of such submissions is lower in written evidence (less than 4 per cent as opposed to slightly over 
6 per cent of oral answers). It may be attributable to a number of factors, including parliamentarians’ 
understandable desire to maximise the utility of evidence sessions with judges, the instinct to seek out 
judicial approval of legislative or policy suggestions as a way of ‘lending jurists’ prestige’53 to the 
committee’s ultimate recommendations, and perhaps also to a lack of comprehensive awareness and 
understanding on the part of committee members about what is appropriate to ask judicial witnesses. 
Chairs of select committees, for instance, do not always explain to panel members at the outset that judges 
are subject to certain constraints, although they may remind them in private before the public session 
begins. But judges sometimes start with a caution of their own, as Sir Igor Judge did before giving evidence 
on the draft Corporate Manslaughter Bill:  
 
Sir Igor Judge, Q491: I am not giving you legal advice and I have to be extremely careful not to 
comment on matters which are actually policy matters for Parliament and which may be 
controversial in the very broad political sense, so I have various inhibitions on me. 
 
Hostility and Deference 
 
Oral hearings are, almost invariably, conducted in a courteous and collaborative manner. Hostile questions 
are virtually unheard of – the closest example we identified was a teasing  question by the Chair of the 
House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee to Lord Bingham in 2004, borne out of protracted 
negotiations with the senior judiciary for housing the proposed new Supreme Court: 
 
Q107 Chairman: Are you not beginning to sound a bit like the popstar who rejects all hotel suites 
which the manager has offered?54 
 
In fact, hostile answers from judges were, though still uncommon, more frequent than aggressive 
questioning. These arose largely in the course of evidence on the Constitutional Reform Bill, with judges 
venting their frustration at the way in which the reform process had been undertaken. Lord Ackner was 
frequently acerbic in his criticism of the government: 
 
Lord Ackner: One finds that throughout the Civil Service. There is an inbuilt resistance to surrender 
any power.55 
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Lord Ackner: I think the Home Office as ruled at the moment does not really understand many of 
the basic tenets of the rule of law and the sooner one does something about it the better.56 
 
On the other side, the courtesy which principally characterises the attitude of select committees towards 
judicial witnesses sometimes borders on deference. Where select committees rely too heavily on the 
evidence given by judges, the utility of the collaborative exercise may be undermined, as the ‘responsibility 
to uphold the rule of law’ through ‘information-sharing and constructive negotiation’ becomes less ‘shared’ 
by the parties to the dialogue, and more one-sided. Too much deference, in this sense, represents 
something akin to an abdication of responsibility on the part of the committee. This is perhaps illustrated 
by comments made by the Chair of the Joint Committee on the Draft Modern Slavery Bill, in the course of 
questioning Lord Judge in 2014: 
 
Q643 Chairman: … I think you have finished off any ideas that the committee might have had about 
putting in a statutory defence.57 
 
Chairman: You are helping to write our report as you sit there. It is immensely helpful.58 
 
 
Advantages to Parliament and the Judiciary from judges giving evidence on bills 
The final question we addressed in this study was to assess the costs and benefits to Parliament and to 
the Judiciary of inviting judges to give evidence on bills.  For Parliament the benefits are clear.  As we 
have shown from the numerous examples given in this article, judges are highly expert witnesses, on the 
law and on its implementation in the courts.  It would be hard to find greater experts.  Sir Andrew 
Longmore, talking about the Insurance Bill, had spent his career in insurance law; Sir Igor Judge, thinking 
about how a trial judge would explain the law to a jury, could draw on his own long experience as a trial 
judge, and of criminal appeals where the summing up had gone wrong; Judge Jeff Blackett, as Judge 
Advocate General, was an unrivalled expert on the law and practice of Courts-Martial.  Judges can 
explain to Parliament not just how a provision is likely to be interpreted, but what its practical impact is 
likely to be – including side-effects which might not have occurred to the legislators.  And judges who 
have chaired inquiries, like Sir Henry Brooke when he was chairman of the Law Commission, or Lady 
Justice Smith who had chaired the Shipman Inquiry, could explain some of the policy thinking behind the 
changes, as well as the law giving effect to them. 
For judges the benefits might seem less clear, and the risks greater.  But there are several benefits.  They 
can point to gaps in the law, as the Family Sub-Committee of Circuit Judges did when pointing to the 
piecemeal protection for battered women, rectified by the Family Homes and Domestic Violence Bill 
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1995.  They can discourage Parliament from passing law which is insufficiently specific (as Lord Woolf 
did over the draft Freedom of Information Bill), or which is over-specific (as Sir Igor Judge did on the 
draft Modern Slavery Bill).  They can encourage Parliament to go further, as Sir Andrew Longmore 
sought to do over the Insurance Bill, and Judge Jeff Blackett with Courts-Martial.  They can warn 
Parliament about practical consequences which might have been overlooked.  And looking more widely, 
they can remind Parliament of the basic principles of the rule of law, as Lord Mackay so eloquently did in 
his opening statement about the UK’s obligations under international law, before discussing the draft 
Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill. 
The main cost to the judges is the time invested in researching and preparing a written submission, or 
attending an oral hearing.  They do not have to give evidence: and at an oral session, they can refuse to 
answer questions which go beyond their proper role.  In the sessions we analysed, the judges did 
occasionally duck a question; but rather more often, they went further than the guidelines strictly allow, 
by getting into discussions of policy or statutory interpretation.  They were able to do this without 
getting into trouble for several reasons.  Although the hearings are on the public record, they attract 
little or no publicity: the media show no interest in bill committees.  Second, the policy issues being 
discussed are often quite narrow and technical, and unlikely to generate political controversy.  Third, 
although judges can sometimes be tempted into giving their view on a question of statutory 
interpretation, we are not aware of any case where subsequently they had to recuse themselves as a 
result.    
So overall, we concluded that there are clear benefits to Parliament and to the judiciary from judges 
giving evidence on bills.  We found no instance of judicial independence being compromised as a result; 
if anything the reverse, since quite a lot of evidence, especially on the Constitutional Reform Bill, 
consisted of robustly reminding Parliament of its importance.  We are not able to report how much 
influence and impact the judges have had, in terms of successfully getting bills amended, which will have 
to await a further, more elaborate process tracing study.  Our purpose in this initial study has been to 
explain what judges talk about when giving evidence on bills; and to argue, as we did in our earlier 
article, that this is a dialogue which is of benefit to both sides.   
